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Abstract In this introduction we present the orthodox account of auditory verbal
hallucinations (AVHs), a number of worries for this account, and some potential
responses open to its proponents. With some problems still remaining, we then
introduce the problems presented by the phenomenon of thought insertion, in particular
the question of how different it is supposed to be from AVHs. We then mention two
ways in which theorists have adopted different approaches to voices and thoughts in
psychosis, and then present the motivation and composition of this special issue.
1 Introduction
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs), namely, hearing voices in the absence of a
speaker, are a common symptom of psychosis that affect approximately 75 % of people
with schizophrenia (Bauer et al. 2011; Nayani and David 1996). AVHs are also seen in
a range of other psychiatric disorders (including bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder and anorexia disorder) and are experienced by a minority of the non-clinical
population (Beavan et al. 2011; Johns et al. 2014). Not only does the context (clinical or
otherwise) in which AVHs occur vary, but the phenomenon’s properties, taken in
isolation, vary enormously as well. Jones captures this heterogeneity nicely in the
following.
The term AVH encapsulates a diverse phenomenological experience, which may
involve single and/or multiple voices, who may be known and/or unknown,
speaking sequentially and/or simultaneously, in the first, second, and/or third
person and which may give commands, comments, insults, or encouragement.
(2010, p.566).
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AVHs can be deeply troubling for those who experience them, and a greater
understanding of them as a phenomenon finds clear motivation in the desire to improve
management and treatment of an often very distressing experience. But beyond this
clinical motivation, there exist a number of theoretical ones, too. There is nothing
obvious about hearing voices, which is to say: nothing that we know about human
beings clearly predicts the presence, prevalence and variety of AVHs. Thus we can turn
this on its head and ask: what does the presence, prevalence and variety of AVHs tell us
about human beings in general, and human cognition in particular? What would human
beings have to be like in order to give rise to the phenomena that we see when people
report AVHs? Some theorists, as we are about to see, make very strong claims about the
nature of the human mind and brain, in trying to account for the presence of AVHs.
In this introduction we set the scene by presenting the orthodox account of AVHs,
which makes use, not only of the notion of self-monitoring, but also of the notion of
inner speech. We then present a number of worries for this account, and some potential
responses open to its proponents. With some problems still remaining, we then
introduce the problems presented by the phenomenon of thought insertion, not least
the question of how different it is supposed to be, as a phenomenon, from AVHs. We
then mention two ways in which theorists have adopted different approaches to voices
and thoughts in psychosis, and present the motivation and composition of this special
issue.
2 The Orthodox Account of AVHs and its Detractors
2.1 Self-Monitoring Accounts of AVH
By far the most popular approach in recent decades has been to account for AVHs in
terms of a problem with self-monitoring (Frith 1992, Fritht et al. 2000, Seal et al. 2004).
The starting point (as with all of these accounts, whether implicitly or explicitly)
is a claim about the human nervous system. In this case, the claim is that your
nervous system is constantly in the business of trying to work out what sensory
stimulation has been produced by itself, or by the outside world. This is called self-
monitoring.
How is self-monitoring actually achieved? The first theorist to postulate a self-
monitoring mechanism was arguably von Hemlholtz (1866). His concern, however,
was with the following problem. When an image moves across the retina, how does our
nervous system know whether it is the world moving across our eyes or our eyes
moving across the world? Helmholtz suggested that our nervous system can tell the
difference because when our eyes move there is a motor command. More specifically,
information about the motor command is used by the nervous system to predict the
sensory consequences that would be produced by the eye movement. If the predicted
and actual sensory consequences match then the nervous system infers that the change
was self-generated and the conscious percept is adjusted accordingly. We can see
exactly what happens when there is no such motor command, and hence no such
adjustment, when we press on our eye with our finger. When we do this, the world itself
seems to tilt and shake. This is because the nervous system is, at some level, taking the
world to be moving across the eye, rather than the eye across the world.
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The same basic idea underlies the self-monitoring mechanism postulated to account
for the symptoms of schizophrenia, including AVHs. The easiest symptoms for which
to introduce the account are delusions of control, since it is clear that, if anything
involves motor commands, and indeed sensory consequences, then bodily actions do.
In delusions of control, a subject may perform actions that are in keeping with her plans
and intentions (for example, she might brush her hair), but she claims that somebody
else is controlling her. Frith and Done (1989) took this to be the result of a mismatch
between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of the bodily movement and so
the movement is attributed to an external source.
Whereas in Helmholtz’s example, the recognition by the nervous system that a
certain stimulus is self-produced causes a correction of the conscious percept, in more
typical bodily motor control, where sensory consequences are proprioceptive and
tactile, it results in sensory attenuation. The benefit of this attenuation is clear: your
nervous system needs to pay attention to stimuli that come from the (potentially
threatening) outside world, not the self-produced stimuli that will tend to be harmless
and irrelevant.
Various data suggest that something goes wrong with this monitoring and subse-
quent attenuation in people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Blakemore et al. 2000;
Ford and Mathalon 2004). Perhaps the most striking such datum is the apparent finding
that people with schizophrenia can tickle themselves. Typical subjects, in contrast,
cannot tickle themselves because their nervous systems accurately monitor, and suc-
cessfully attenuate, the sensory consequences of the tickling movements (Blakemore
et al. 2000).
How is this applied to AVHs? The basic idea is that in schizophrenia or, more
generally, psychosis, there is one deficit concerning the monitoring of self-
produced stimuli, and that different symptoms arise depending on what kinds
of stimuli are failing to be properly self-monitored. In delusions of control it is
physical action that fails to be properly monitored, whereas in AVH it is so-
called Binner speech^. Although different theorists have different views about
what inner speech is (see Alderson-Day and Fernyhough 2015 for a compre-
hensive review) it is, roughly, the production and experience of speech without
any overt articulation. It is, so to speak, Bthat little voice inside one’s head^,
often associated with verbal thinking.
Thus we get the orthodox view of AVHs: they are to be understood as the result of
disrupted monitoring of inner speech.
2.2 Problems for Self-Monitoring Accounts
One could criticise self-monitoring accounts in at least two different ways. One way
involves saying that, regardless of whether the mechanism that is postulated could
potentially account for what we want to account for, the mechanism postulated
somehow does not make sense. The other involves admitting that the mechanism (in
this case badly monitored inner speech) makes sense, in principle, but does not account
for what we need it to account for.
To take these in turn, a prima facie objection would be to deny that inner speech is
any kind of action or motor process. It therefore cannot be self-monitored, given that
self-monitoring exploits information from motor commands (often referred to as
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Befference copies^) to inform its predictions. As a result, the idea that inner speech can
be misattributed, just like any other action, does not get off the ground.
However, arguably, there are reasonable grounds to think of inner speech as
an action, with its roots in the motor system (see Jones and Fernyhough 2007).
Although it is not intuitively obvious that inner speech is motoric, this has been
empirically supported by several electromyographical (EMG) studies (e.g.
Jacobsen 1931) which picked up muscular activity during inner speech. Later
experiments have also made the connection between inner speech and AVH,
showing that similar muscular activation is involved in healthy inner speech
and AVH (Gould 1948). The involvement of motoric elements in both inner
speech and in AVH is further supported by findings from Gould (1950), who
showed that when his subjects reported hearing voices, subvocalizations oc-
curred which could be picked up with a throat microphone. This is unlikely to
be the case for all AVH (Jones 2010), but suggests that motor involvement in
both inner speech and AVH should not be ruled out.
Another more pressing criticism grants that inner speech is (or might be)
motoric, but questions whether it would ever be the kind of thing to be
monitored. Since it is not an overt action occurring in three-dimensional space,
it is not clear that it generates any sensory consequences, at least not in
anything like the usual sense. Nor is it clear that there can be a mismatch
between the actual and predicted sensory consequences; a mismatch that is
central to the classic self-monitoring account. There are various ways of
amending the inner speech model to avoid such a problem: for example, one
might argue that inner speech is simply an attenuated form of external speech,
using the same (or similar) neural architecture and thus generating its own
predictive models. Alternatively, certain psycholinguistic approaches associate
the experience of inner speech with the sensory prediction itself (e.g. Scott
2013), thus avoiding the need to posit a separate sensory prediction for an
internal state that is Bcompared^ to inner speech. Such approaches still need to
explain how misattribution can occur, but offer a way of retaining the speech-
motor basis of AVH. Nevertheless, there are arguably no convincing and
comprehensive accounts of where inner speech sits within a self-monitoring
model (Alderson-Day and Fernyhough 2015), and its proponents have in recent
years moved away from posting it as an explanation for AVH (e.g. Frith 2012).
The second family of criticisms grants (even if only for the sake of argument) that
inner speech could, in principle, be self-monitored, and that this, in principle, could go
awry, but denies that this explains AVHs. Following Wilkinson (2014), we call these
criticisms or challenges the varieties of AVH challenge and the auditory phenomenol-
ogy challenge.
The varieties of AVH challenge is, quite simply, that AVHs vary so much (as we saw
at the beginning) that it seems unlikely that all of them are to be accounted for in terms
of misattributed inner speech based on self-monitoring problems. One response to this
is to say that the orthodox inner speech model accounts for at least some of the things
we call AVHs (McCarthy-Jones et al. 2014a).
The auditory phenomenology challenge can be stated as follows. Granting, for the
sake of argument, that AVHs are misattributed episodes of inner speech resulting from
self-monitoring problems, we must explain how we get a transformation from.
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the experience of the subject’s own inner voice […] often lacking acoustical
properties such as pitch, timbre, and intensity into the experience of someone
else’s voice with acoustical properties. (Cho and Wu 2013, p.2).
In short, how does inner speech become auditory?
There are various responses available to counter this worry. One is that a close
inspection of the phenomenology of AVH suggests that perhaps not all AVHs are
clearly auditory, and so, in order to account for these, we would not need to account for
auditory phenomenology. (More on this later) Another response is to attack the premise
of the argument, and deny that inner speech truly lacks all of these features in all cases.
For example, one might insist that inner speech can and does have auditory phenom-
enology, and/or second-person pronoun use, and/or the representation of other agents
(see, for example, Fernyhough 2004; Alderson-Day and Fernyhough 2015).
Nevertheless, a puzzle remains for theorists who posit the link between inner speech
and AVH – if inner speech is misattributed, why does that result in an alien voice, and
not an alien thought?
2.3 Enter Thought Insertion
This brings us to another way in which the picture is complicated by (what is typically
taken to be) a separate phenomenon, also commonly associated with diagnoses of
schizophrenia, namely, the phenomenon of thought insertion. Thought insertion (TI) is
often described as the phenomenon of experiencing someone else’s thoughts. One
common approach has been to explain TI also in terms of misattributed inner speech;
that is, the normal processes of self-monitoring fail in some way, and inner speech is
not recognised as one’s own. But then, if inserted thoughts and AVHs are to be
explained in the same way, then why are not they reported as being the same
phenomenon?
One possibility is that they are actually the same underlying experience, but because
the experience is highly unusual and hard to describe, it is being reported in different
ways by different people. In support of this are examples of phenomena that appear to
blur the lines between the two experiences: for instance, Bleuler (1950) also described
examples of Bsoundless voices^ and Baudible thoughts^ in the case reports of people
with schizophrenia that he saw. Thus, it could be that experiencing inserted thoughts,
and hearing soundless voices, are actually one and the same phenomenon; the same
experience, interpreted and reported differently. This somewhat deflationary view
would still need to explain individual differences in how the experiences are described,
but at least offers a means to account for AVH and TI under one model.
Another possibility is that AVH and inserted thoughts represent variations of the
same underlying experience, and that these variations (in, for example, perceptual
phenomenology), drive different descriptions of AVH and TI. In support of this idea
is the fact that AVH and TI often co-occur in people who report them (Nayani and
David 1996), suggesting that people are choosing to describe phenomenologically
separable experiences in separate terms. On this reading, silent voices and inserted
thoughts are both the same phenomenon (at a suitable level of abstraction), but the
explanatory challenge is to shed light on why they are reported as different phenomena,
perhaps due to the context in which the phenomenon arises, or the nature of the
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phenomenon itself (whether this be a difference in the kind of self-monitoring failure,
or the kind of inner speech).
Finally, AVH and TI could simply fall under different categories and require
different explanations. While the two experiences often co-occur, they have different
prevalence rates, with the former thought to be much more common (see Badcock
2015). Thought insertion, for example, is often classified in psychiatric terms as a kind
of delusion; a matter of belief, rather than perception (as in the case of AVH). If they are
separate phenomena, the self-monitoring theorist needs to explain why misattributions
in inner speech apply to AVH and not TI (or vice versa).
2.4 Updated Accounts of AVH
As the above concerns show, the self-monitoring orthodoxy is not entirely unproblem-
atic. At best, it needs to be supplemented; at worst, it needs to be abandoned altogether.
Contemporary research in voice hearing is starting to depart from this orthodoxy in
exciting ways. Although the pressure is coming from two very different sources, both
point towards something similar: namely, a need to account for the complexities, and
varieties, of the phenomena in question. In particular, we need to be wary of the
tendency to assume that all of the phenomena we call AVHs are one and the same
phenomenon, explainable in terms of an overarching model.
One source of change comes from theoretical neuroscience. A new frame-
work (see Clark 2013 for review) is viewing what the brain does in terms of
knowledge-driven prediction. This framework either subsumes (Fletcher and
Frith 2009) or dispenses with (Van Doorn et al. 2013; Adams et al. 2013)
self-monitoring. If hallucinations and other experiences in psychosis are taken
to involve errors in prediction, this has scope for explaining much more and to
do so in a more fine-grained way, incorporating cutting-edge neurobiological
(Corlett et al. 2010) and computational work (Friston 2010), and accommodat-
ing person-specific influences, such as life context and personal history. Within
this framework, predictive processing can be disrupted in a number of ways, as
a result of a number of causes, with the potential to generate several variations
and subtypes of AVH and TI (Wilkinson 2014).
The other source of change comes from a renewed recognition of the
importance of first-person experience in understanding AVH (McCarthy-Jones
et al. 2014b; Sass 1994). Theorists in psychology and philosophy have been
interacting more with clinicians, patients and even activists to develop a closer
understanding of what it is like to hear a voice (e.g. Longden et al. 2012;
Woods et al. 2015) putting direct pressure on the need to recognise complexity
and heterogeneity in our understanding of psychosis. Not only are there the
commonly differentiated symptoms, but, within AVHs alone there is an over-
whelming degree of diversity. This has led many theorists to accept that, if
models that understand AVH in terms of misattributed inner speech are tenable,
they may only apply to a subset of experiences (Jones 2010). Along with
increasing recognition of voice hearing in the non-clinical population (Larøi
2012), this has led to a broader and richer view of hallucinations and other
abnormal experiences, and a renewed focus on revising standard models of
AVH and TI.
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3 Motivation and Content of the Special Issue
It is against this backdrop that this special issue finds its motivating questions. In this
section we present these, and show of how various contributors address them.
First off: If we experience thoughts in our head, how can they seem to not be our
own? That is the central paradox of thought insertion. To understand this, though, we
need to explore what thoughts are and how we know them in the first place. In his
paper, Johannes Roessler outlines two views about knowledge of our own thoughts,
attributed to Gilbert Ryle. The first, is that we are Balive^ to our own thoughts in the
Bserial process^ of thinking, and the second is that we can Beavesdrop^ on our inner
speech, and interpret our own utterances in much the same was as we interpret the
utterances of others. Roessler argues that the former is the correct account of how we
know that (and what) we are thinking for the vast majority of the time. On this reading,
unusual cases such as thought insertion depend on a breakdown in this experience, such
that thoughts are not intelligible in terms of an ongoing serial process.
One consequence of this view is that it reframes the standard way of thinking about
thought insertion (Gallagher 2000, 2004). The standard approach wants to explain
thought insertion in terms of certain features of the phenomenology of a thought.
According to the standard account, there are two ways in which a thought can be
experienced as Bmine^. One is that it can be experienced as falling within my
psychological boundaries; the other, is that I can experience myself as somehow its
agent, or source. The first sense is referred to as Bownership^, and the second as
Bagency^ (Gallagher 2000) or more recently, as Bauthorship^ (Bortolotti and Broome
2009). Due to disruptions in the phenomenology of thought, perhaps attributable to
self-monitoring deficits, patients who report an inserted thought experience that thought
as retaining Bownership^ (so Bmine^ in one sense), but lacking Bagency^ (so Bnot
mine^ in another).
If Roessler and Ryle are right, then this approach is too decontextualized (although it
may be along the right lines). A thought is not a free-standing experience. It is not,
therefore, describing or explaining some unusual aspect to the phenomenology of a
thought, qua an experience, that will provide the account of thought insertion. Rather,
thinking is a deeply contextually-embedded, serial process that one is usually Balive to^
when one is doing it. Thought insertion would then result from a disruption to this
practical awareness of what one is doing. Roessler does not go as far as to suggest a
cause of such disruption, but one could hypothesise that various different things – and
different kinds of thing - could act as contributors, from overwhelmingly strong
emotions to deficits in working memory. It is worth noting that standard accounts that
appeal to retained ownership but lost agency are often criticised for failing to account
for why some thoughts that, intuitively, lack agency, are not reported as inserted.
Among such thoughts are obsessive or intrusive thoughts. In contrast, on a view that
built on Roessler’s claims, one would be Balive to^ intrusive and obsessive thoughts
even if one did not feel that one had brought them about agentively or endorsed their
content.
In her paper, Rachel Gunn also questions orthodox accounts of thought insertion.
She proposes that accounts of thought insertion that posit ownership without agency
miss the point about the experience, and, in particular, are not going into enough detail
about the different things that Bownership^ can mean. Drawing on a range of vivid,
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first-person accounts, Gunn argues that inserted thoughts lack what she calls Bpersonal
ownership^, that is, a sense of ownership where thoughts are consistent with one’s own
unique experience and context, a sense of Bmyness^ that accompanies our thinking the
rest of the time. Although methodologically Roessler and Gunn’s contributions are
worlds apart, their take-home messages for our understanding of thought insertion have
strong continuities.
Whereas Gunn focuses on thought insertion as an experience (granted, one that is
deeply context-dependent), Pablo Lopez-Silva, in contrast, focuses on thought inser-
tion as a kind of delusion. That is to say, the question of explanatory relevance is not:
BWhat is this person experiencing?^, but rather: BWhat might lead someone, not so
much to experience their thoughts as inserted, but to form the belief that a thought has
been inserted?^ This belief need not be a straightforward endorsement of strange
phenomenology accompanying an episode of thinking (where what is thought, the
thought content, is not explanatorily relevant), but rather a rational appraisal to a
particular thought content. Thus, for Lopez-Silva, the content of the inserted thought
is of crucial explanatory relevance. TI is not simply the product of a low-level
disruption to phenomenology, according to which any old thought, in principle, could
be experienced as inserted. More specifically, the core claim is that the delusion of
thought insertion is one which protects the individual from ego-dystonic cognitions –
thoughts that clash with our own sense of Bme^. Furthermore, Lopez-Silva argues that
we must pay more attention to the role that affective disturbances play in driving and
generating ego-dystonic thought contents.
Such disturbances play a key role in the tradition of phenomenological
psychopathology, within which the article by Peter Handest and colleagues
firmly falls. In their article, they offer an introduction to the work of
Klosterkotter, Conrad, Sass, and Parnas on how a range of disruptions to
thoughts and perceptions can develop into auditory hallucinations in the context
of schizophrenia. Drawing on the work of Conrad in particular, they posit that
gradual changes in the salience of the world around an individual (apophany),
the anxiety that the world holds (trema), and the tendency to reflexively focus
on one’s own experience (hyper-reflexivity) combine to give rise to a situation
where thoughts are given their own external agency and perceptual quality. In
such a context, both hearing voices and having inserted thoughts are part of the
same overall disruption to the self (ipseity) that occurs in psychosis, which
Handest et al. illustrate with a number of case examples.
Two papers that also seek to bridge the gap between AVH and TI are
provided by Humpston & Broome and Badcock, one focusing on phenomenol-
ogy; the other, on neuropsychology. In the first, Clara Humpston & Matthew
Broome use first-person accounts to emphasise the phenomenological continuity
between experiences of voices and thoughts in psychosis. While recognizing the
place of appraisal and elaboration, they reject the idea that TI should primarily
be considered a delusion (contra, e.g. Lopez-Silva 2015) and place it on a
quasi-perceptual continuum with soundless voices and auditory hallucinations.
For Humpston & Broome, though these experiences differ in audibility, they
share a number of characteristics in terms of their disrupted agency and
ownership, and they suggest that, in practice, the majority of patients will have
a mixed experience of both of these phenomena.
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Johanna Badcock, meanwhile, offers a glimpse of how combined accounts of AVH
and TI might be accommodated in a neuropsychological model. Neuroimaging
evidence from ordinary voice perception suggests that multiple processing
streams in the brain are responsible for recognising voice identity, location
and other features. Badcock uses these findings, along with epidemiological
data, to propose a parallel processing framework that can account for alien
experiences of voices and thoughts. Specifically, she argues that both AVH and
TI result from disruptions to neural networks responsible for audition and
language, but that their phenomenology will vary depending on which specific
network components are affected. She also places this model within the pre-
dictive processing approach (Clark 2013; Wilkinson 2014), suggesting that it
can be integrated with more global models of perception and action.
Finally, there are questions that are not related to thought and thought
disturbance, but more to orthodox accounts of AVH. In particular, if voices
result (in some way, at least) from inner speech, how do we account for the
Botherness^ of their identity? And what is being compared when we generate an
episode of inner speech? Drawing on arguments from Gallagher (2004) and Wu
(2012), Gregory argues that we can make more sense of AVH as misattributed
imagined speech (or auditory verbal imagery), rather than inner speech. In turn,
inner speech has more in common with actual speech than with verbal imagery.
This approach touches on an older tradition of thinking about AVH, and a set of
unresolved questions regarding the relationship between inner speech and imag-
ery. Regarding the former, imagery-based explanations of AVH in fact predate
inner speech models (Mintz and Alpert 1972), although evidence of imagery
processes differing between people with and without AVH has been somewhat
inconsistent (Aleman et al. 2003). Regarding the latter, inner speech would be
considered by many as distinct from imaginative processes. However, the lines
we draw between vivid instances of inner speech and verbal content in auditory
imagery are not at all clear, especially if we allow for features such as dialogue
and tone in our concept of inner speech (Alderson-Day and Fernyhough 2015).
In stark contrast, Peter Langland-Hassan offers a solid defence of a revised
inner speech model, via an emphasis on sensory attenuation rather than sensori-
motor comparison. Key to self-monitoring accounts is the idea that sensory cortex
is typically dampened in response to self-generated stimuli. Langland-Hassan
draws on evidence of this to suggest that we can account for AVH without
reference to the comparison between prediction and action traditionally included
in self-monitoring accounts. He also extends this account to incorporate thought
insertion and thought disorder, with reference to semantic errors in Wernicke’s
aphasia. In this condition, the content of what a person says often differs consid-
erably from their intended meaning, as a function of the aphasia. Langland-Hassan
uses this example of semantic self-monitoring failure to highlight how the inter-
actions between speech production and perception lie not just in prediction of
sensory consequences, but also in the expression of content: the detection of what
is being said, just as much as what it sounds like. This opens up a new way of
thinking about unusual voices and thoughts that depart from the Btrain^ of thought,
whether that is considered a serial operation (Roessler), a violation of personal
ownership (Gunn), or an example of ego-dystonia (Lopez-Silva).
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4 Directions for Future Research
The phenomena of AVH and thought insertion pose unusual explanatory challenges, in
that they force us to examine fundamental questions about thought, perception, and
agency. The articles collected here demonstrate the breadth of inquiry necessary for
examining what it is to experience an AVH or have an inserted thought. Moreover,
many of these contributions highlight the importance once again of closely examining
first-person descriptions of unusual experiences, and making sure that convenient
taxonomies do not hide a continuum of similarities across superficially separate
phenomena, or indeed lump together distinct but superficially similar phenomena.
Needless to say, further work from philosophers, psychologists, psychiatrists, etc. is
essential to answering the questions posed by voices and thoughts in psychosis.
Some of these questions are highly general, focusing more on human cognition
generally, and only having an indirect impact on our understanding of psychosis. For
example, we might ask: is the nervous system really just a prediction machine in the
way that some recent theorists suggest? If so, then self-monitoring theories are along
the right lines, but the basic principle needs to apply beyond prediction of self-produced
stimuli to prediction of all stimuli. This clearly has potential impact for our under-
standing of psychosis, since if prediction does not rely on motor commands, and
psychosis is a problem with this sort of low-level prediction, then explanations of
psychotic symptoms need not be restricted to phenomena that involve motor com-
mands (Wilkinson 2015). Another question we might ask is: What is the relationship
between inner speech and thought? There does seem to be an interesting relationship
here, but not all inner speech is thinking (see Roessler 2015), and not all thinking is in
inner speech. In which case, it’s a short step from this to the question: might some cases
of thought insertion be non-verbal (e.g. imagistic)? If the answer to this is yes, then
inner speech cannot plausibly be implicated in (at least those cases of) thought
insertion.
Other questions are more directly tied to psychosis. For example, we might ask:
What is the relationship between trauma and psychotic symptoms like AVH and voice
hearing? If trauma is a strong causal factor, by what mechanism does it exert the causal
influence that it does? These questions are more typically the realm of clinical
psychology and psychiatry journals, but it seems clear that important ground is made
when philosophers, psychologists, psychiatrists and neuroscientists interact.
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